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ABSTRACT 
The Major League Baseball draft is virtually the only means by which US and US 
territory born players have access to becoming major league baseball players.  As a 
condition of their initial contracts, players are subjected to initial contract terms, that limit 
their traditional free market ability to earn a salary commensurate with their actual worth. 
This research attempts to quantify the difference between what players would earn on the 
open market, as free agents, and what they earn by being controlled by baseball’s reserve 
clause, by analyzing the current compensation system established by Major League 
Baseball, how drafted players have limited leverage in negotiations, and whether their 
compensation approximates actual provided value.  The result of this analysis is clear that 
players on their initial contracts over perform relative to their compensation, relative to 
players who signed open-market contracts.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Baseball economics are a dynamic and interesting system to study, as there are limited 
methods by which there are entries to the labor market, and a closed number of buyers in 
a virtual monopoly.  Since the inception of Major League Baseball in the 1870’s, they 
have developed and controlled the labor market for baseball players and the quantity of 
professional baseball games for the general public to watch.  Over that time, there have 
been several collective bargaining agreements and several rule changes governing the 
method by which a player becomes employed by a team.  The rule changes and the 
sometimes acrimonious bargaining negotiations have affected every aspect of baseball, 
from the existence of the minor leagues, to free agency, to competitive balance on the 
field, and to how players are compensated based on different employment statuses.  
 Major League Baseball (MLB) has consistently changed how players are 
compensated, what negotiating leverage they have, and how adequately their 
compensation approximates their marginal revenue product with the stated purpose of 
increasing parity on the field.  Prior to the inception of the players’ draft, the mechanism 
by which parity was intended to be maintained was the players’ contracts (Rottenberg, 
1956).  The player draft was created to supplement that intended purpose. 
The initial part of the paper will give a basic history of the First-Year Player 
Draft, including information about the inception of the draft, iterations of the draft, and 
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perceived purposes of those changes.  Next will be a discussion of MLB’s reserve clause, 
and how that impacts negotiating leverage for drafted players.  There will also be a 
description of the arbitration process built within the collective bargaining agreement, 
which determines “fair” pay for players at certain times in their initial contract.  
Finally, there will be a methodology by which players’ contributions can be 
evaluated, relative to their salaries, as well as what forecasted expected value can be 
derived based on draft position, field position, and entry status using a statistic called 
Wins Above Replacement (WAR). 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF THE MLB DRAFT 
The Major League Baseball Rule 4 draft, also known as the First-Year Player Draft, has 
occurred annually since 1965 (Staudohar, Lowenthal, and Lima, 2016).  Since the 
inception of the draft, there have been many rule changes, generally designed to increase 
economic competitive balance, as well as reduce the overall compensation to drafted 
players.    
 Starting prior to WWII, the most talented young prospects were involved in 
bidding wars, where the wealthiest and most powerful teams were acquiring the majority 
of young talent.  There was a system of rules in place that governed how players could 
enter the league, the uniform contract that players would sign, and how players could 
migrate from one team to another.  In the cases of the most talented players, there would 
be multiple teams offering contracts, with the key differences being the annual salary and 
the signing bonus.  Then, as still exists today, there was significant variance in the 
outcome of players signed at 17-22 years old, so wealthy teams signed as many of the top 
prospects as possible for redundancy.  In order to address this, MLB created a series of 
rules designed to reduce overall costs and create competitive balance between teams.  
The latest iteration of this rule, first imposed in 1953, required that any player signed for 
a bonus of over $4,000 was required to spend two years on the major league roster.  This 
limited teams from sending these players to their farms systems for seasoning, resulting 
in young, inexperienced players occupying roster spots, but not actively contributing to 
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the team.   The system was rife with loopholes; particularly use of disabled list slots for 
these players, resulting in the rule being rescinded in 1958.   Although there were some 
Hall of Fame players among these “bonus babies,” like Sandy Koufax, Al Kaline, and 
Harmon Killebrew, there were many that never contributed to any substantial degree.  
The lack of playing time inhibited development. Additionally, the lack of free agency in 
baseball meant that teams that signed players controlled the players for the balance of 
their careers.    
 When the rule was rescinded in 1958, negotiations reverted to the way they were 
prior to 1953; that is, player bonuses were increasing substantially. Record-setting 
bonuses were being given annually to amateur players, reaching a breaking point when 
the Los Angeles Dodgers signed college outfielder Rick Reichardt for $205,000 in 1964.   
The competitive balance problem was magnified even further, and MLB determined that 
a fix was necessary.   
 The MLB Draft was instituted in 1965 as a method of improving parity and 
reducing the cost of young, unproven amateur players.   The draft was intended to 
eliminate the power of economic imbalance allowing higher revenue teams to hoard the 
highest perceived talent, and allow teams to draft and control players based on their finish 
in the previous year’s season.  Additionally, by allowing teams to control drafted players, 
it reduced player negotiating leverage.  Bidding wars were no longer occurring.   The first 
player picked in the 1965 MLB Rule 4 Draft was Rick Monday, by the Kansas City 
Athletics, and he signed for a comparatively paltry $104,000.  It was not until Darryl 
Strawberry in 1980 that a player reached the $205,000 bonus mark set in 1964.  
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 The structure of the draft has been essentially the same since instituted.  The MLB 
draft consists of 50 rounds, with teams selecting in reverse order of the previous year’s 
standings.  Amateur players who have completed their senior year of high school and 
have not yet enrolled in college, players that are junior or seniors in a traditional college, 
players that are in junior college, or players that are 21 years old are eligible to be 
drafted.  If a player is drafted, but chooses not to sign with the drafting team, the player is 
eligible to be re-drafted at the following period of eligibility.  The length of negotiation 
has changed over time, and as of now the player has until August 15th to sign with the 
drafting team.   During that time, the team is required to make an offer to the drafted 
player; the player’s right is limited to negotiating with that team, with the perceived 
leverage being that player’s ability to re-enter the draft in the future.  For example, if a 
high school player is drafted, the drafting team has exclusive negotiating rights with that 
player for a set period of time.   If the player determines that the bonus offer is not 
sufficient to sign, the player can enroll and play in college or in junior college.  After 
reaching the next eligibility threshold, that player can be drafted again, by either the same 
or a different team.  Once again, there is an exclusive period of negotiation, and the 
player can determine whether to sign the contract.   
 Until 2012, teams were limited only by their own budget constraints in 
determining how much to offer.  Between 2007 and 2012, MLB suggested confidential 
“slot values” for each draft position, but teams were not bound to those limitations.  
Players receive very minimal compensation for playing in the minor leagues, so the 
majority of their compensation for the first several years of their playing career was 
determined by the bonus amount.  This is where negotiating leverage comes into play; 
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players that are drafted out of high school, junior college, or as juniors in a traditional 
college have the ability to return to school and negotiate anew in the future.  College 
seniors lack that negotiating leverage; they are bound to the team that drafted them, or 
have the choice to play in an independent league.  If the player chooses to play in an 
independent league, the player is subject to re-drafting the following year, while having 
lost a year of ML development.   
 Beginning in 2012, MLB again altered the structure of the draft and instituted 
draft pools. The draft pool is the amount of money that can be offered in bonuses to 
drafted players.  The pool is determined by aggregating the total value of each draft 
position in the top ten rounds.  Each draft position has a value relatively higher than the 
next position, so teams that have multiple and higher draft picks have larger draft pools.  
After the top ten rounds, players have a specific amount they are offered outside the draft 
pool, however, if a team chooses to offer higher than that slot value, it comes out of their 
overall draft pool.  This was intended again to reduce the overall compensation going to 
entry-level players and to increase economic parity; until the draft pools were created, 
teams were routinely exceeding the recommended slot values.  The impact of this was 
that players, prior to the draft, would make teams aware of their bonus demands.  This led 
to lower budget teams drafting players they could more assuredly sign, and higher budget 
teams getting higher talent players later in the draft they could afford to sign.   This had a 
different than intended impact on the draft as a whole, but still led to decreases in top 
player compensation (Garmon, 2011).  Prior to 2012, draft bonuses were again setting 
records nearly every year.  Per Baseball America, in 2011, Gerrit Cole was drafted first 
overall by the Pittsburgh Pirates, and signed for a record $8MM.  Additionally, in 2009 
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and 2010, the Washington Nationals selected Stephen Strasburg and Bryce Harper, 
respectively, and offered both major-league deals with bonuses of $7.5MM and 
$6.25MM.  After implementation of the draft pools, the highest bonus has been given to 
Kris Bryant of the Chicago Cubs, at $6.7MM on a traditional minor league contract.   
 This has led to a different sort of “gaming” the system.  Teams now have 
incentive to draft players higher than their projected draft slot, allowing lower bonuses to 
be given to higher drafted players, saving the difference between their bonus and the 
slotted amount to be used to pay players drafted later in the draft.  In some instances, high 
school players perceived as being more difficult to sign are being drafted by teams that 
have been able to save money earlier in the draft, and offered money beyond their draft 
slot value to entice them to sign.  That said, it is considered a more equal playing field, as 
the penalties for exceeding the draft pool are significant.  By MLB draft rules, a team that 
exceeds its bonus pool by 5%-10% will surrender their first round pick the following 
draft; higher excesses lead to even more significant penalties.  
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CHAPTER III 
MLB’S RESERVE CLAUSE AND ARBITRATION 
Baseball’s reserve clause was first instituted by owners in 1879.  Initially, it was a 
method for each team to “reserve” five players from their teams, such that no other team 
would negotiate with those players. Eventually, the clause expanded to encompass the 
entire major league roster.  For the majority of baseball’s history, the reserve clause 
restricted movement of players between teams; ultimately, each player was owned by the 
team that initially contracted him.  Player movement could occur via trade, or if a player 
was released, however, in the first instance, the player would be owned by the acquiring 
team, and in the second, releases generally only occurred if a player no longer had any 
perceived value.  This removed virtually all negotiating leverage for players.  They were 
property of the team that signed them, and the only recourse they could take to demand 
higher compensation was to refuse to play.  Naturally, taking that step led to reduced 
popularity among fans of the players, and teams would suspend payment to players that 
refused to play, so it was ineffective as leverage.  
 The reserve clause was, like the draft, instituted with the stated purpose of 
preserving competitive balance, to prevent high-revenue teams from acquiring all 
available talented players. Like the draft, however, it had the ultimate effect of reducing 
player compensation and saving teams significant amounts of money. The reserve clause 
was challenged early on in court, which led directly to baseball receiving an antitrust 
exemption in 1922.   For nearly the next 50 years, teams continued to enjoy exclusive 
control over their players, until Curt Flood challenged a trade in 1969.  Although he was 
ultimately unsuccessful in court, that case, combined with increasing strength of the MLB 
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Players Association (MLBPA), and the work of MLBPA President Marvin Miller in a 
case brought before arbiter Peter Seitz, led to the reserve clause being removed in 1976 as 
part of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated that year.  
 An important distinction to note is that the MLBPA represents only current MLB 
players.  This means that there is significant incentive for the MLBPA to negotiate to the 
benefit of existing players, even at the expense of first year players entering the draft.  
The collective bargaining agreement struck in 1976 created the rule that players with six 
years of MLB experience (called “service time”) would be allowed to become free 
agents.  The inverse, however, is also true; players with fewer than six years of MLB 
experience are still constricted under the existing remnants of the reserve clause.  This 
means the majority of the MLBPA, and in particular, the highest paid members of the 
MLBPA, will consist of players who have more than six years of experience.  The 
subsequent collective bargaining agreements have reflected that; there have been many 
changes in the draft, in methods of free agent compensation, and in rights for experienced 
baseball players, but there has not been any reduction in the amount of time that teams 
control young players.  From an ownership and team perspective, this is the correct result 
of the time, coaching, and money that goes into developing and compensating players 
who are contributing no marginal revenue product on an annual basis, and may never 
contribute any marginal revenue product.  However, as will be discussed in the data 
portion of the paper, this is largely misleading.   
 Except in rare instances historically, players sign a minor-league contract after 
being drafted.  In another attempt to improve parity and reduce negotiating leverage for 
drafted players, as of the most recent collective bargaining agreement, this is the required 
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path; major league contracts may no longer be offered to drafted players.  This leads to 
the player receiving the bonus, and minimal compensation on an annual basis as a minor 
league player.  Baseball has two major league rosters; the 40-man and the 25-man.  The 
25-man roster is the daily roster that a team plays with.  The players on the 40-man roster 
are eligible to be called up to the ML team at any time without releasing a player.  When 
a player is on the 40-man roster, the player may still be playing in the minor leagues, but 
will be compensated differently.  Per MLB contract rules, minor league players earn 
$1,150/month for short-season leagues, $1,300 month for low-A league baseball, and 
$1,500 for high-A league baseball, with annual increases of $50/month if a player repeats 
the same league.  Players in AA receive $1,700/month with annual increases of $100 for 
repeating, and players in AAA receive $2,150/month initially with more substantial 
annual increases for repeating.  Once a player is on the 40-man roster, as of 2015, the first 
year salary was $41,400 and second year was $82,700.  More importantly, once a player 
reaches the 25-man roster, service time accrual begins.    
 Service time is defined as the number of years and days that a player has been on 
the 25-man roster, and is the sole measure of experience for purposes of determining 
benefits and free agency status.  There are a maximum of 172 service days earned in a 
given baseball season, which equals one service year.  In the first three years of service 
time, players will earn the major-league minimum; in years four through six, players will 
be eligible for arbitration.  It is important to note that the measurement is based on full 
service years.  Teams will often keep their best first-year players in the minor leagues 
long enough to ensure they will not exceed 172 service days in their first year; by doing 
this, the team gets nearly seven years of control.  This is further complicated by the 
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arbitration clause in initial contracts.  Players will become eligible for arbitration 
depending on their service time; generally speaking, it’s after three full year’s accrual of 
service time, but the top 22% of each first-year class becomes eligible for arbitration after 
their second year. They are called “Super-Two” players, and will earn a higher salary in 
their third year after arbitration or through an agreement with the team.  
 Baseball arbitration is a variety of final-offer arbitration (Cassing and Douglas, 
1980.)  This is defined as arbitration where each side before the arbiter will make a “final 
offer,” which the arbiter must choose between.  The player and the team will submit their 
argument to the arbiter as to why their offer is fair.  From both sides, there will be a study 
of players with similar statistics, and who earn similar salaries to the final offer.  The 
arbiter cannot compromise a settlement; it must be either the player’s offer, or the team’s 
offer.  This is important, because arbiters tend not to choose extremes; in other words, 
even if a player was exceptional, and thus asking for an amount that greatly exceeds 
previous arbitration agreements, the arbiter will tend to choose the team’s offer.  From a 
player’s perspective, then, it makes sense to offer a safe, attainable salary as opposed to a 
fair one, and from a team’s perspective, that limits the upside potential of salary.  As is 
common in game theory situations, being risk-averse will inhibit your ability to achieve 
fairness, and so final-offer arbitration in baseball tends to be biased towards the teams.    
 There are obvious implications here in terms of efficient allocation of resources 
for major league teams.  Since players in the first six to seven years of their major league 
careers are cost-controlled, they are a lot more likely to have a positive return on 
investment relative to players that are negotiated with on the free agent market.  From an 
allocation of resources standpoint, having a player who can provide similar value at a 
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discounted price allows for resources to be allocated elsewhere.  Additionally, assuming 
an annual fixed budget for player salaries, this means that players within their control 
years earns less; allowing players in free agency to earn more.  When collective 
bargaining agreements are negotiated, the players who would lose the most by 
eliminating or reducing the number of years under control are doing the negotiating.  
Similarly, if teams were to be forced to increase their salary outlay for drafted players by 
having to negotiate on fair terms, as opposed to with limited pools, they would reduce 
their potential salaries by a commensurate amount.  This means that it is unlikely that 
collective bargaining will be a possible method to increase fair share salaries.  
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CHAPTER IV 
PLAYER VALUATIONS AND COMPENSATION 
Advanced baseball analytics, commonly referred to as sabermetrics (adapted from 
“Society for American Baseball Research”), have become the primary method of 
evaluating players and teams on an annual basis.   The Society for American Baseball 
Research (SABR) was created in 1971 among a group of baseball researchers.  
Contemporarily, Bill James began releasing an annual book called The Bill James 
Baseball Abstract.  Even prior to that, certain economically-oriented baseball personnel 
were using statistics that went further than the back of a baseball card.  However, it was 
not until the proliferation of widely available baseball data with the advent of websites 
like BaseballProspectus.com in the 1990’s, in conjunction with technological 
improvements allowing for faster and more powerful calculation that sabermetrics 
became a central component of every baseball front office.  Even with that, drafted 
baseball player value is still difficult to predict (Burger and Walters, 2009). 
 Each team has its own internal mechanism to evaluate players.  The easy 
availability of data, however, means that several publically available websites have 
developed methods to evaluate players and make projections.  The most widely accepted 
all-in statistic at this time is known as Wins Above Replacement (WAR.)  WAR is a 
statistic derived from a formula that uses a variety of statistics to approximate how many 
“wins” a player adds to his team over a fictional “replacement” player.   The value in 
using WAR is that it is calculated such that it can be used to compare players across all 
positions, across leagues, and across teams.  Statistics within WAR standardize for 
ballpark variability and positional differences.   Variability from ballpark to ballpark 
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causes substantial differences in traditional statistics; it is clearly easier to hit in Colorado 
than in San Diego, because of ballpark differences and climate differences.  Similarly, an 
identical batting line as a first baseman and shortstop provide two different values, as 
shortstop is the far more difficult position to play defensively.  Additionally, with a 
comprehensive statistic like WAR, position players and pitchers can be compared for 
their relative values provided. WAR is not standardized; there are several varieties of 
WAR widely available.  For purposes of valuation, each has positives and negatives; for 
data gathering purposes, rWAR, from Baseball-Reference.com, had the most accessible 
database.  rWAR is calculated with the following formula:  
rWAR = (Pruns – Aruns) + (Aruns – Rruns)  
where batting runs, baserunning runs, runs added or lost in double plays, fielding runs, 
positional adjustment runs, and replacement level runs are aggregated.   Pruns is player 
runs generated, Aruns is average runs generated, and Rruns is replacement level runs 
generated.  Changes are made as necessary to positional adjustments, as there is variation 
over time in fielding performances.   The definition of replacement level is a player that 
would be easily available on the open market or in a team’s farm system at any given 
time.  Currently, rWAR uses a .294 winning percentage as replacement level, which 
allows for 1000 WAR distributed across baseball. This has changed over time, as the 
number of teams or the number of games has varied.  The formula is below.   
30*162*(.500-.294) = 1,000 Wins above replacement 
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Wins are also divided between pitchers and hitters at a 41:59 ratio; this reflects team 
spending.  Offensively, an average player is worth 20.5 more WAR than a replacement 
player; a pitcher 18.7 more WAR than a replacement player.   
 WAR does have some issues that limit its usefulness in evaluating single seasons.  
In particular, defensive metrics have wide variability by player from year to year.  This 
implies that defensive measurements do not yet tell an accurate story of a player’s ability. 
Further, defensive metrics do not measure first base or catcher well, as both positions 
have different responsibilities in terms of on-field actions.  Catchers, in particular, 
provide additional value by “framing” pitches, or by how they receive and present the 
ball to the umpire, that can earn extra strikes, and in aggregate, extra outs.  WAR does 
not measure this.  Finally, WAR does not measure anything other than pure statistical 
input.  Although this is valuable in economic terms, teams continue to place value on 
versatility, leadership, personality, and community orientation.  Evaluating a player’s 
value on these unmeasurable concepts becomes more difficult; clearly, they’re built into 
their market value, however, it’s impossible to quantify with current methods.  
 For the purposes of this analysis, the accuracy of the definition of a replacement 
player and the accuracy of fielding metrics is less critical. Taken in aggregate, we know 
for certain that the number of wins that occur during a baseball season is fixed, and that 
the credit for these wins can be broken out among players in a ratio that can give at least 
a roughly accurate picture of relative contributions to each team.  Further, since the 
formula does not differentiate on age or service time, it is a useful tool to analyze the 
relative contributions of seasoned veteran players versus young players on their initial 
contracts.   
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 Gauging the accuracy of WAR can be done by regressing WAR against the 
number of team wins for the year.  It would not be anticipated to be an exact calculation; 
baseball games still have an element of “luck,” that is defined as currently unmeasurable 
randomness, sequencing, and variability.  An example of sequencing variability would be 
as simple as a walk followed by a triple producing a run; a triple followed by a walk 
would not.   Aggregate team WAR for the season is still quite a good measurement, as 
seen in Figure 1 and Table 1.  As more full seasons accumulate, the r-squared 
measurement increases.   
 
Figure 1: War versus Wins, 2000-2015 
 
WAR 
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Table 1: Regression Statistics               Model Summary 
Name     Estimate   StdError  t.value  p.value 
 
  
There are a variety of ways to determine a player’s value, and both have been 
explored in the past.  A method used by Dave Cameron of Fangraphs was to determine 
value based on free agent contracts signed in that offseason, using a present-day value 
calculation for future player values.  Alternatively, using the league as a whole, simply 
dividing total baseball payroll by 1,000 (Total WAR,) gives a rough estimate of how 
much each team is paying for each additional win.  A third method is to use salaries of 
players that have been on the open market, against their previous year’s WAR.  That 
would take all players with in excess of 6 service years, and divide their salaries by their 
WAR.  This does have the impact of leaving some players who had open-market 
contracts negotiated because they were not subject to the draft, particularly international 
players, in the other group; however, that number of players is relatively small and has a 
small impact on the aggregate. This also leaves players who have negotiated away their 
arbitration years in exchange for a longer-term contract in the group of under 6 service 
year players.  This is intentional; going year to year on contracts and being potentially 
subject to arbitration is only one of the options available to young players.  By accepting 
lower salaries in the future in order to gain higher amounts now, they are using the 
limited leverage they have in order to gain some long-term assurance.  This does lead to 
significant discounting in future years.  
(Intercept) 50.80 0.87 58.56  0.00   
WAR 0.90 0.02 36.57  0.00   
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 The chart below shows the result of that calculation for the 2015 baseball season.  
Around 71% of WAR was generated by players on their initial contracts, yet they earned 
only 37% of total salaries for the year.   
 
 The salary difference is stark.  This shows that a majority of the best baseball and 
a majority of the wins being produced by individual players is being produced by players 
who are being paid less relative to other players producing less.  In fact, of the 38 players 
who produced a rWAR of 5 or more in 2015, only 11 were players with greater than 6 
service years.  The average salary in that group for the year was a little over $17MM, the 
average for the players under 6 service years was a little over $4.3MM.   
 This shows some of the difficulty in assessing a true value of players.  Were 
players on their initial contracts more accurately compensated, there would be less money 
available for those that are on their free agent deals.  Using the $/WAR for players over 
six service years, it appears that teams are paying about $8.5MM for each WAR on the 
open market.  Assessing after the fact makes some assumptions; specifically, that in the 
aggregate teams generally have a fairly accurate idea of how much value will be provided 
in the future.  It also assumes that there is a linear return per WAR and that teams receive 
the same marginal value per WAR.  These assumptions are not strictly true, however, in 
the aggregate, and in comparison to players on their first contracts, it still allows for an 
assessment of fairness to be made. Included in the average salary computation is also 
“dead contracts,” or money given to players who have not retired, but who are not 
Group Annual Salary ($1MM) WAR $/WAR ($1MM)
Annual Aggregate Player Salaries: 3,866 1000 3.866
Players > 6 Service Years 2,450 286.9 8.539
Players <6 Service Years 1,417 713.3 1.986
Table 2: Salary per WAR by Service Time Group
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physically capable of playing, or who are no longer considered good enough to make a 
major league roster.  Stripping out these salaries, it is fair to assess the value as $8MM 
per WAR for an open market value.  
 We know that there are 1,000 WAR divvyed out annually.  We know that overall 
baseball salaries aggregate to nearly $4 billion.  If salaries were given out after the fact 
based on performance, the amount given to each player would be $4MM per WAR 
generated.  Free agent contracted players are earning twice that; first-contract players are 
earning well under half that amount.  By itself, this is enough to say that salary equity 
based on performance is not occurring in baseball, and that the lack of leverage for 
drafted players is the primary cause of that. 
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CHAPTER V 
PROJECTING VALUE OF DRAFTED PLAYERS 
Major League Baseball has the reputation of having the least projectable draft pick 
results.  There are a variety of reasons for this; unlike other sports, baseball is not played 
on a uniform field.  Distance to the outfield fences, amount of foul territory, and other 
considerations can change the on-field results dramatically.  Further, players develop at 
different paces, at least in part as a result of their geographic location.  Baseball is 
generally played outdoors, in spring and summer conditions.  In Western and Southern 
US, players have the ability to have that sort of weather a majority of the year.  In the 
Midwest and Northeast, that time is reduced dramatically.  Per the Baseball Almanac, f 
the 525 US-born players in the ML as of the beginning of this season, 49% are from 
California, Florida, Georgia, and Texas.  On the other hand, North Dakota, New 
Hampshire, Montana, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming combine for zero. A player from 
one of those states would have to be truly exceptional in a short period of time available 
to play to be drafted.  Geography is one reason that Mike Trout, who has averaged a 
historic 9.4 rWAR since his first full season, was not drafted until 25th overall by the 
Anaheim Angels in 2009.  Mike Trout was born and played in New Jersey; there are only 
9 current major leaguers from New Jersey.  Finally, age and injuries also make baseball’s 
draft unpredictable.  As mentioned earlier, players are often drafted out of high school; 
there is a significant 
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amount of projection necessary in drafting a high school player.  Injuries, particularly to 
the shoulder and elbow of pitchers, are also very difficult to predict at this time, and can 
derail a major league career.   
 Given these projection difficulties, it has been the position of baseball ownership 
that unproven players should not be paid similar amounts to proven players.  There is also 
a financial cost in acquiring these players, from their initial bonus, to development in the 
farm system, to the initial scouting and crosschecking required before making a draft pick 
commitment to the player.  The data analyzed was from 1990 forward; there are two sets 
of data, one that ends in 2010, and one that ends in 2015.  Using the more recent data, 
that ends in 2015, provides extra data points, but also includes a dampening effect of 
players that have only been in the major leagues for 0-5 years.  Expected values were 
calculated in three different ways, each providing similar information.  Ordinary least 
squares regressions were applied using a variety of variables, including dummy variables 
for field position, high school or college players, and more generally hitters versus 
pitchers.  Draft position by round, by draft pick, and by a more customized round 
approach were also done.  There is also average WAR by draft pick, and average WAR 
by draft round.  In each of these cases, where a player was drafted is the best method of 
projecting future value of a player.  Career WAR was used, rather than WAR in the first 
six years.  There were two reasons for that; first, it is an added layer of data gathering 
complication to separate out WAR by year by player.  Second, a team that drafts a player 
already owns the first six years of that player’s career.  The team also maintains exclusive 
negotiating rights to that player for the years beyond the first six, until the initial contract 
expires.  The team may not re-sign the player, and thus, the player’s future value will 
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accrue for another team, but the team has the ability to sign the player at market value at 
that time.  There is a certain value in that.   
 
 
 Figures 3 and 4 show average WAR by round, per Baseball-Reference. Salary 
data was available at BaseballProspectus.com.   The Average WAR column shows the 
average WAR provided from drafted players that have made it to the major leagues.  Max 
WAR shows the highest number of wins provided, and Total number shows how many 
players in each round contributed.  It also shows the likelihood that a player will make 
Round
Average 
WAR Max WAR
Total 
number %MLB Variance St. Dev Adj. WAR
Projected 
Value 
($MM)
1 7.46 118.80 664.00 82.0% 185.73 13.63 6.1 17.4
2 4.76 70.00 333.00 41.1% 121.18 11.01 2.0 5.6
3 2.80 41.80 256.00 31.6% 40.98 6.40 0.9 2.5
4 2.39 44.30 217.00 26.8% 38.01 6.17 0.6 1.8
5 2.40 46.00 208.00 25.7% 42.11 6.49 0.6 1.7
6 3.01 58.70 167.00 20.6% 60.03 7.75 0.6 1.8
7 2.62 44.10 152.00 18.8% 42.07 6.49 0.5 1.4
8 3.98 45.50 131.00 16.2% 82.08 9.06 0.6 1.8
9 2.60 52.40 117.00 14.4% 56.04 7.49 0.4 1.1
10 2.68 28.60 126.00 15.6% 34.75 5.90 0.4 1.2
Table 3:  Average WAR by Round 1990-2015
Round
Average 
WAR Max WAR
Total 
number % MLB Variance St. Dev. Adj. WAR
Projected 
Value 
($MM)
1 7.97 118.8 608 77.4% 199.19 14.11 6.2 17.5
2 4.76 70 333 42.4% 121.18 11.01 2.0 5.7
3 2.80 41.8 256 32.6% 40.98 6.40 0.9 2.6
4 2.39 44.3 217 27.6% 38.01 6.17 0.7 1.9
5 2.40 46 208 26.5% 42.11 6.49 0.6 1.8
6 3.01 58.7 167 21.2% 60.03 7.75 0.6 1.8
7 2.62 44.1 152 19.3% 42.07 6.49 0.5 1.4
8 3.98 45.5 131 16.7% 82.08 9.06 0.7 1.9
9 2.60 52.4 117 14.9% 56.04 7.49 0.4 1.1
10 2.68 28.6 126 16.0% 34.75 5.90 0.4 1.2
Table 4: Average WAR by Round 1990-2010
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the major leagues by pick and by round.  That is a key variable; players who do not make 
the major leagues provide zero value and are not included in the average WAR 
calculation.  To evaluate by round, average WAR is multiplied by the percentage 
likelihood of making the ML, and to calculate the projected value.  This results in a 
projected career value; naturally the players at the high end of the WAR spectrum would 
be worth quite a lot more.  Additionally, one would expect a portion of that value would 
occur after the first six years of the player’s career.  To adjust for that, the projected value 
was multiplied by .73, which was, for 2015, the percentage of overall WAR contributed 
by players that had yet to reach their six full service years.   In figures 4 and 5, it shows 
that the first round value is largely skewed towards the top, such that even the average 
first round projected value would fall well short of what the player could be reasonably 
expected to produce.  Players that far exceed expectations do get compensated more; 
David Price has received the highest compensation at $19.75MM for 2015, however, he 
contributed 29.2 rWAR, for a value of $116.8MM at $4MM per WAR.  In his 8 seasons, 
encompassing his 6 full service years, Price earned $53.5MM in salary, and a $5.6MM 
bonus, for a combined total of $59.1MM in cash compensation.  That is slightly over half 
of the value he provided during that time based on an even distribution between all 
players for WAR contributed.  Even for the highest paid players with successful 
arbitration results, there is a significant shortfall.   
 The results from Tables 3 and 4 are as one would expect in a non-random 
selection of players, with an emphasis on drafting better players earlier.  In earlier rounds, 
there is a higher level of predictability that a player makes the major leagues, and 
certainly a higher level of expected value provided.  Later rounds take on more of a 
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“lottery ticket” aspect, where there are still significant contributors, but at a lower 
percentage and an overall lower value.  
 Table 5 shows regression statistics for drafted players.  The only statistically 
significant variable is draft position; this is an expected result, as each MLB team has an 
analytics department with significant data evaluating capabilities.  Even with bonus pools 
restricted, the MLB draft is a significant financial expenditure, and teams are highly 
incented to draft players with the highest likelihood of success.  Within their draft 
calculations, the weighting given to position, age, and geography should result in a draft 
pick that mirrors the likelihood of reaching the major leagues, as well as succeeding at 
that level.   
 
Variable Estimate
college 1.85
(.33)
junior college 1.81
(.31)
high school 4.01
(.70)
round picked -0.097
(-5.09)
infield 2.48
(1.46)
outfield 2.05
(1.18)
pitcher 0.08
(.05)
catcher 0.78
(.43)
_cons 2.4
(.40)
N 2371
Adj. R-Squared 0.0315
T-values in parenthesis
Table 5: WAR versus Draft Variables
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Association have 
consistently worked towards collective bargaining agreements that work to the benefit of 
existing, experienced players.  There is certainly evidence that the bulk of the work is 
being done by players that are compensated less, in the expectation that “their time will 
come.”  This is a significant problem, however, in that there is additional risk being taken 
during that period of time that a player is earning less than the value being provided.  
There are any number of players whose careers have ended prior to having reached their 
sixth full year of service time; for those players, the value they have provided and the 
amount they have been paid will never be equal.  In other instances, players will catch up; 
the aforementioned David Price signed a 7-year $217MM contract in the offseason; if he 
were to average 5.7 rWAR for the length of his contract, he would be at a break-even 
point for his career as a whole.  He has only reached 5.7 rWAR in two seasons through 
his career thus far, however.  In this case, the risk is no longer on the player, but on the 
team that acquired him through free agency.   
 It is possible that 2015 was an anomaly in the context of the value being provided 
by younger players relative to more experienced players. 2015 was an exceptional year 
for first year players, heralded in the media as one of the greatest rookie classes of all 
time, per Fangraphs. 
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That would have the effect of overvaluing the .71 multiplier in value calculation.  
There is some evidence, as well, that the past 5 rookie classes have been better as a 
cohort than previous cohorts as well, which does skew the results.  Even with that 
information, the ratio of compensation between free-agent players and first-year contract 
players is still so distinct, that it is clear that the draft restrictions and the reserve clause 
artificially and unfairly limits compensation for drafted players to a significant degree.  
The largest pool for the team with the most draft picks for the 2016 MLB draft is held by 
the Cincinnati Reds, with a pool of $13,923,700.  Cincinnati has the second overall pick 
and supplemental first round pick, as well as a single pick in rounds 2-10.  For 
comparison, adding up the expected value from average draft picks in the first ten rounds 
from 1990-2015 is $36.2MM.   The $22MM shortfall is a very large difference, and is 
being added as compensation to players who provide less value.  
It will be valuable to analyze the direction of this over the course of the next 
several years; the MLB draft has become increasingly data driven, relative to scouting 
driven, and there is a higher likelihood of drafting successfully today than many years in 
the past.  Additionally, the careers of several of the players in this analysis are current and 
ongoing; the correlations between draft position and rWAR will change over time.  
Another valuable aspect of information that is lacking, but would have been 
helpful for this analysis is a comprehensive list of international amateur free agents 
signed over time; those players, until 2012, were not restricted in terms of signing bonus, 
which allowed higher bonuses to be paid.  It is not an ideal comparison; these players are 
typically 16 years old, which leads to higher variance in performance, but it does give a 
line of sight on what bonuses could be if players were unrestricted by the draft. 
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